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 Russian dreams and Prussian ghosts: Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal 
University and debates over historical memory and identity in Kaliningrad 
 
Alexander Clarkson, King’s College London 
 
Abstract 
 
This article will examine how the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University and the 
Kaliningrad State Technical University have come to exert considerable influence over 
debates surrounding historical memory and identity in the Kaliningrad region. Under the 
direct control of the Russian Federation, the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad is surrounded by 
member states of the European Union. While the region’s universities have helped to 
strengthen links between Kaliningrad and institutions across the European Union, the way the 
students and staff interact with the Russian state reflects cultural tensions in Kaliningrad 
society. A detailed examination of the history and identity of Kaliningrad’s universities can 
therefore provide deeper insights into the region’s balancing act between Europe and Russia 
as well as the way universities can influence local debates over history and identity. 
Keywords: Kaliningrad; university; Russia; Germany; historical memory 
 
Though the end of the Cold War saw the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Central 
Europe, one sliver of territory resolutely remained under Moscow’s control. Part of the 
Russian Federation after the collapse of the USSR, the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad was 
surrounded by states that would eventually join the European Union. Isolated from what its 
residents have come to call the Russian “mainland”, Kaliningrad’s cultural identity remains 
ambiguous.1 With local elites hoping to pursue economic opportunities that deeper integration 
with the European Union could provide, debates within Kaliningrad about the region’s 
relationship its European neighbours have often been a source of tension with the central 
government in Moscow.2  
 
As an intellectual space building links between Kaliningrad and educational institutions 
across the European Union, the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University and the Kaliningrad 
State Technical University have become key actors in debates over historical memory and 
identity in the region. For the past thirty years debate within these higher education 
institutions and the interaction of their students and staff with the Russian state have reflected 
wider cultural tensions in this region. As a consequence, evolving interest in the region’s 
Soviet and pre-Soviet history within these universities can both provide insights into 
Kaliningrad’s balancing act between Europe and Russia as set out interesting perspectives on 
the broader role universities can play in reflecting as well as shaping debates over history and 
identity in regions that have experienced the collapse of an established political order. 
 
For as Martin Klimke pointed out in his study of student protest in post-1945 Germany and 
the United States in the 1960s, universities have often become focal points for social change 
in societies experiencing a high degree of social pressure.3 With their development highly 
vulnerable to shifts in the political economy that may affect their financial position and 
institutional prestige, as Rosemary Deem has pointed out universities often struggle to resist 
pressures to reshape their curriculum to reflect the ideological agendas of social milieus that 
                                                          
1Joel C. Moses, ‘The Politics of Kaliningrad Oblast: A Borderland of the Russian Federation‘, The Russian 
Review, no. 63 (2004), 10. 
2Christopher S. Browning/Pertti Joenniemi, @Contending Discourses of Marginality: The Case of Kaliningrad’, 
Geopolitics 9, no.3 (2004), 717. 
3Martin Klimke, The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global 
Sixties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 23–24. 
have achieved a dominant position within the power structure of their societies.4 Moreover, as 
Pierre Bourdieu has outlined the role universities play in shaping the ideological outlook and 
career paths of future members of elite government cadres has made oversight of higher 
education a key priority for state institutions working to ensure that students and alumnus 
remain committed to the established political order.5 As a consequence, universities 
themselves have become spaces in which conflicts within elites over historical narratives are 
regularly played out, as Joseph Moreau demonstrated in his study of political conflict over 
history textbooks in the United States.6 In their attempt to engage with and partially revive the 
pre-Soviet history of their region, high education institutions in Kaliningrad reflected these 
different dynamics shaping the interaction between universities and political institutions in 
times of rapid political and economic change.  
 
On the political map of Europe, Kaliningrad appears as a curious anomaly. Bordered on the 
east by Lithuania, the South and West by Poland and facing Sweden across the Baltic Sea, as 
an oblast of the Russian Federation, Kaliningrad is entirely surrounded by member states of 
the European Union. Until 1945, this territory belonged to the German region of East Prussia, 
whose capital Königsberg was a major political and economic hub linked to cities across East 
and Central Europe. Though the region around the city was largely rural and dominated by the 
great estates of the Prussian aristocracy, Königsberg itself had some industry and a heavily 
used port that became the basis for a significant level of prosperity. By the First World War 
the city had expanded to become a cultural centre for the region with a concert hall, opera 
house and established educational institutions.7 
                                                          
4Rosemary Deem, ‘Globalisation, New Managerialism, Academic Capitalism and Entrepreneurialism in 
Universities: is the local dimension still important?’, Comparative Education 37, no. 1 (2001):  11. 
5Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 
1998), 181. 
6Joseph Moreau, Schoolbook Nation: Conflicts over American History Textbooks from the Civil War to the 
Present (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 176. 
7Stefanie Schuler-Springorum, ‘Assimilation and Community Reconsidered: The Jewish Community in 
Konigsberg, 1871-1914’, Jewish Social Studies 5, no. 3 (1999): 105 –106.  
 One of the institutions that provided Königsberg with a reputation that reached beyond East 
Prussia was the Albertus-University. Founded in 1544 by Duke Albrecht of Prussia, it rose to 
European prominence in the course of the eighteenth century. While Immanuel Kant acted as 
its rector in the 1780, other key figures in the German intellectual history, including Herder, 
Fichte and Schiller, either studied or taught there. A key benefactor of the reform of the 
Prussian state in the early nineteenth century, the Albertus University was one of the first 
German universities to systematise the study of Botany, Mathematics and other sciences.8   As 
a prominent institution in a city that remained loyal to the Hohenzollern dynasty at times 
when Berlin seemed out of control, the Albertus University was also major recipient or 
patronage from the Prussian royal family. By the 1860s, an ambitious building programme 
around a central campus expanded its infrastructure, making the Albertus-University a 
prominent part of the urban landscape of Königsberg.9 
 
By the early twentieth century the Albertus University had become an established part of the 
European academic scene as well as a space in which the senior nobility of Prussia could 
educate its sons those of wealthy mercantile families from East Prussia, Scandinavia and 
Russian-ruled cities on the Baltic coast. The university’s student fencing fraternities, the 
Burschenschaften, connected alumnus across the Baltic region with one another and their 
alma mater. Even with the enormous damage suffered by East Prussia during the First World 
War, the Albertus University maintained these international links, working with universities 
in newly independent Baltic states and Polish universities despite territorial tensions between 
Germany and Poland.10 
                                                          
8Riccardo Pozzo, ‘Aristotelismus und Eklektik in Königsberg’, in Die Universität Königsberg in der Frühen 
Neuzeit, ed. Hanspeter Marti/Manfred Komorowski (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2008), 176–177.    
9Christian Tilitzki, Die Albertus-Universität Königsberg: Ihre Geschichte von der Reichsgründung bis zum 
Untergang der Provinz Ostpreußen 1871 – 1945 (Bd 1), (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2012), 34. 
10Tilitzki, Die Albertus-Universität Königsberg, 391–392. 
 Yet the decline of the university long preceded its final destruction in the last months of the 
Second World War. With the rise of the National Socialist movement, liberal or Jewish 
members of factory forced to flee to universities in Sweden or Finland. Over time, even 
conservative professors who remained loyal to the Prussian ideal began to chafe at the 
ideological restrictions of the National Socialist regime and often sought early retirement or 
careers elsewhere in Europe. By the late 1930s the university of Immanuel Kant had become 
an intellectual backwater. Despite attempts by the Hitler regime to turn it into a centre where 
academics could develop research designed to create new systems of rule for territories 
conquered during Wehrmacht offensives in Poland and the USSR, by the time Soviet soldiers 
crossed over into East Prussian territory in the winter of 1944 the university had largely 
stopped functioning.11  
 
Like all other institutions in East Prussia, the Albertus University ceased to exist as the entire 
German population either fled or was expelled by Soviet authorities in 1945. The region itself 
was divided between Poland and the USSR, with Soviet portion fatefully apportioned the 
Russian union republic rather than the Soviet successor Republics of the once independent 
Baltic states. Even before the first settlers were relocated from across the Soviet Union into 
the newly renamed city of Kaliningrad, Soviet troops systematically demolished most of its 
buildings including the campus of the Albertus University. This was in line with a 
reconstruction plan sanctioned by Stalin based on the architecture and planning requirements 
of Soviet model cities in Russia and Ukraine.12 
 
                                                          
11Friedrich Richter, 450 Jahre Albertus-Universität zu Königsberg Preussen 1544-1944 - Berichte und 
Dokumentationen zu ihrer jüngsten Geschichte - Die 400-Jahrfeier vom Juli 1944 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 
Verlag, 1994), 8. 
12Bert Hoppe, Auf den Trümmern von Königsberg: Kaliningrad 1946 – 1970, (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 
2000), 20–21. 
In the short term, attempts by the Soviet government to ensure the near complete suppression 
of any German legacy from pre-1945 East Prussia in the newly reconstitute oblast of 
Kaliningrad seemed to be destined for success. With large parts of Kaliningrad deemed a 
military zone closed to foreigners under Stalin and Khrushchev, the new Soviet settlers in the 
city were discouraged from discussing the region’s pre-1945 history. As a consequence, 
schools established during the period of reconstruction were based on a Soviet cultural 
framework, deliberately detached by central authorities from any possible continuity with the 
traditions of the region’s pre-war institutions such as the Albertus University.13 
 
The settler population itself largely was made up of former Red Army soldiers as well as rural 
and urban professionals that had been effectively press ganged from across the Soviet Union 
into settling in still ruined towns and villages. While farmers or industrial workers from far 
flung cities in the Soviet north or Siberia such as Murmansk and Norilsk volunteered with 
great enthusiasm, city dwellers from Ukraine sent to rebuild the city of Kaliningad and staff 
its various institutions had to be coerced into remaining by the NKVD and police.14 Despite 
these initial pressures, by the late 1950s the population of the region had stabilised to the 
extent that reconstruction efforts made considerable progress. The increasing stability and 
self-confidence of the Soviet order in Kaliningrad also led to the foundation of educational 
institutions, with the development of a regional university and a separate technical university 
put in place by the late 1960s. One popular slogan set out by the regional Communist Party 
immediately after the war underscored efforts by Moscow to stabilise the region’s identity 
around a Soviet cultural model: 
 
                                                          
13Stefan Berger, ‘How to be Russian with a Difference? Kaliningrad and its German Past’, Geopolitics 15, no. 2 
(2010): 348. 
14Yurii Kostyashov, Секретная история Калининградской области. Очерки 1945-1956/The Secret History of 
Kaliningrad Oblast 1945-1956, (Kaliningrad: Terra Baltica, 2009), 78. 
Go with unquenchable hatred towards your enemy! It is your holy duty to... enter the cave of 
the beast and punish the fascist criminals! 15 
 
As with the population of the region as a whole, the first generation of academics teaching in 
Kaliningrad’s new higher education institutions were drawn from the rest of the USSR. This 
reflected an underlying structural problems with universities that were designed to train local 
loyal cadres for Soviet order who were intended to staff Kaliningrad’s regional Communist 
Party and state institutions. With the region dotted with military installations and the state 
barring most foreigners were from entry during the late Cold War, many scholars only spent a 
few years at the universities there before moving back to more prestigious institutions in more 
influential cities. Similarly, though the number of native born Kaliningraders continued to 
grow the lack of substantial employment prospects beyond local farms, some industrial 
facilities and an overwhelming military presence meant that a large proportion of graduates 
tended to seek work elsewhere in the RSFSR or other major Soviet republics.16  
 
As a consequence, though there was growing interest in the pre-Soviet history of the region 
among a small band of locally born intellectuals the academic culture of the region remained 
oriented towards the ideology and historical narratives of the Soviet state. Like other settler 
societies dominated by a strong military presence, Kaliningraders recreated much of the state 
culture of their society of origin in an environment unmediated by the presence of a strong 
indigenous presence. For such a regionally and culturally diverse group of settlers the key 
unifying factor remained the institutions and rituals of a shared Soviet experience.17 Though 
the emergence of a first native born generation of Kaliningraders fostered a greater sense of 
                                                          
15‘Идите с неутолимой ненавистью к своему врагу! Это ваша святая обязанность ... войти в пещеру зверя 
и наказать фашистских преступников!’ in Hoppe, Auf den Trümmern von Königsberg, 19. 
16Ingmar Oldberg, ‘The emergence of a regional identity in the Kaliningrad oblast’, Cooperation and Conflict 
35, no. 3 (2000): 272. 
17Ibid, 273. 
rootedness, the region’s territorial and institutional integration in the USSR meant that links 
with Moscow and other key centres remained strong. As Kaliningrad chronicler Ilia Maximov 
pointed out this limited the extent to which the local population developed a sense of 
distinctiveness from the rest of the Russian Socialist Federal Republic or the USSR as a whole 
during the Brezhnev era: 
 
This issue was not of interest during the Soviet time, mostly because of the ban [on open 
discussion of East Prussian history] but also because the population had with the settlement of 
the region little time to explore an alien culture that was associated with Fascism. The 
disinterest towards German culture can also be partly explained with the partial analphabetism 
of the first settlers.18 
 
This regional dynamic only began to change once the reforms introduced by Mikhail 
Gorbachev began to radically alter the social structures of the USSR as a whole. As separatist 
sentiment swept the Baltic Republics that separated it from the RSFSR, Kaliningrad became 
increasingly cut off from the rest of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the collapse of Soviet 
state meant that the military institutions that had shaped Kaliningrad life since 1945 were 
suddenly less socially dominant. Moreover, the contraction of employment opportunities in 
what territorially isolated Kaliningraders were coming to call the Russian ‘mainland’ created 
a situation where by the mid-1990s there were far fewer incentives for graduates to leave the 
region for Moscow St Petersburg.19  
 
                                                          
18In der sowjetischen Zeit war dieses Thema nicht interessant; hauptsächlich wegen des Verbotes und auch weil 
die Bevölkerung in den ersten Jahren der Erschließung des Gebietes keine Zeit für die fremde Kultur hatte, die 
zudem mit dem Faschismus assoziiert wurde. Die Gleichgültigkeit gegen die deutsche Kultur kann man auch 
zum Teil über das Halbanalphabetentum der ersten Umsiedler erklären.“ Ilia Maximov, ‘Der Kaliningrader: Wer 
ist er?‘, in Auf den Spuren von Königsberg (Frankfurt an der Oder: Viadrina Online, 2008), 
https://homepage.univie.ac.at/philipp.ther/kaliningrad/kaliningrader.html 
19Pertti Joenniemi and Andrey Makarychev, ‘Process of Border-Making and Border-Breaking – The Politics of 
Kaliningrad’, Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, no. 7 (2004): 5. 
Facing their own severe economic downturn exacerbated by the region’s territorial position, 
local political and cultural elites were faced with a difficult set of choices. With the Yeltsin 
presidency mired in infighting and wars in the Caucasus, Kaliningrad remained a peripheral 
priority for the Russian state. Massive cuts in education spending affected higher education, 
with the universities losing some of the best staff and lack of building maintenance often 
undermining the ability of whole faculties to function. As both the military and industrial 
pillars of the region’s economy fell apart, political leaders and academics who had once 
served the Communist Party of the Soviet Union more or less loyally searched for funding 
and trade opportunities that closer links with the European Union might generate.20  
 
At the same time, with the Soviet order that had once shaped the region’s cultural frames of 
reference defunct, both elites and the wider population began to look for alternative historical 
and cultural frames through which to express a regional sense of identity increasingly distinct 
from a distant Russia Federation. This search for stability in a chaotic period of institutional 
collapse and social changes was summed up well in 1993 by Evgeny Popov, who had been 
appointed as the head of the city’s architectural office at a time at which the Soviet regime 
was still dominant a decade before: 
 
To resurrect the architectural face of the city we have to examine various ideas. But before I 
go into detail I would like to deal with a question that has long concerned our architects, 
namely the spatial redevelopment of the city centre. In particular this is about the empty 
spaces in the centre of the city. Its construction depends on those commissioning [projects].  
For example this could become a business centre. Such a structure would, however, require a 
developed communications and road network. It could also be a cultural centre. Not only 
architects, it could also let artists fulfil their potential. Personally I would prefer the latter 
                                                          
20Stefan Gänzle and Guido Müntel, ‘Europeanization ‘Beyond’ Europe? EU Impact on Domestic Policies in the 
Russian Enclave of Kaliningrad’, Journal of Baltic Studies 42, no. 1 (2011): 60.  
variant. It would reflect the character of the urban layout of our city more. High rise buildings 
fit in badly with the medieval milieu of our city.21 
 
Though interest in Kaliningrad’s pre-Soviet history had already been building within the 
universities in the late 1960s, particularly in the university history department this activity had 
remained largely focused on the preservation of the remnants of Prussian architecture and 
other buildings and relics built under German rule.22 Such small scale activism that couched 
critiques of the Soviet present through an interest in a German past began to gain a degree of 
momentum over the course of the 1980s as a growing number of Kaliningrad born residents 
took interest in city beautification initiatives at a moment of state decay. Though not yet a 
direct challenge to Soviet ideology, initiatives such as the establishment of the Deutsch-
Russisches Haus in 1993 or the restoration of the Lutheran Salzburg church in the town of 
Gusev (or Gumbinnen before 1945) represented a major shift in historical discourse in a 
region where discussion of the pre-1945 past had been a taboo only a decade before.23 As the 
need for external investment became increasingly clear, even state officials provided some 
support to historical reconstruction efforts in an effort to explore possible routes to reviving 
the local economy.24 
 
                                                          
21“Um das architektonische Antlitz der Stadt wiedererstehen zu lassen, muß man verschiedene Ideen prüfen. 
Doch bevor ich darauf eingehe, möchte ich eine Frage anschneiden, die seit langem unsere Architekten bewegt, 
und zwar die bauliche Gestaltung des Stadtzentrums. Es geht vor allem um den leeren Raum im Zentrum der 
Stadt. Seine Bebauung hängt von Auftraggebern ab. Das kann z.B. ein Geschäftszentrum sein. Solch eine 
Struktur setzt allerdings ein entwickeltes Fernmelde- und Straßennetz voraus. Es kann auch ein Kulturzentrum 
sein. Da könnten nicht nur Architekten, sondern auch Künstler ihr Potentioal zur Geltung kommen lassen. Ich für 
meinen Teil würde die zweite Variante vorziehen. sie entspricht dem Charakter der baulichen Gestaltung unserer 
Stadt mehr. Die Hochbauweise paßt zum mittelalterlichen Milieu der Stadt schlecht.” Ilia Popov, ‘Königsberg - 
Kaliningrad: Gestern, Heute, Morgen‘, Königsberger Express, no. 5 (1993): 4.  
22Stefan Berger, ‘How to be Russian with a Difference? Kaliningrad and its German Past’, Geopolitics 15, no. 2 
(2010): 349. 
23‘Assoziation „Deutsch-Russisches Haus“’, Über Uns - Deutsch-Russisches Haus, http://www.drh-
k.ru/deu/page/uber_uns, date retrieved: 20 August 2016 and ‘Salzburger Anstalt Gumbinnen‘, Stiftung Salburger 
Anstalt Gumbinnen, http://www.salzburger.homepage.t-online.de/Anstalt.htm, date retrieved: 17 April 2016. 
24Olga Sezneva, ‘Architecture of Descent: Historical Reconstructions and the Politics of Belonging in 
Kaliningrad - the Former Königsberg’, Journal of Urban History 39, no. 4 (2012): 772. 
With this growing willingness to open up debate about Kaliningrad’s pre-Soviet history, the 
conditions for a full blown process of reconciliation with potentially generous German 
partners were in place by the time the USSR ceased to exist in December 1991. With the 
removal of state travel restriction, better off Kaliningraders able to get visas at newly opened 
consulates were able to cross into Poland and even Germany with increasing frequency. Such 
regular access along with the chaotic and crime ridden politics of the exclave fuelled cross-
border smuggling, causing concern among Polish law enforcement agencies worried that such 
instability that would hold up Poland’s accession to the EU. Yet it also increased daily 
interactions between Kaliningraders, Germans and Poles at a time at which the region’s 
population had significantly less contact with everyday life in the rest of Russia.25 
  
As important to the region’s economy was the surge of interest among Germans of East 
Prussian origin as well as the German state in the region. That often very right wing writers 
for the Ostrpreußenblatt, the newspaper of the East Prussian community, would make 
comments such as “Russian hospitality is unmatched“ in 1993 shows how many former 
expellees wanted to find a way of renewing some contact with their former homeland.26 By 
the mid-1990s, German tourism as well as more limited inward investment from German 
individuals and businesses helped stabilise the region’s economy. The opening of German, 
Polish and Lithuanian consulates as well as cultural institutes and Catholic and Lutheran 
churches marked the beginning of a period in which the EU and states neighbouring 
Kaliningrad developed ambitious plans to foster economic initiatives through which the 
exclave could act as a bridge to help Russia’s wider integration into Western institutions. The 
exclave’s unique geostrategic position and the great interest of Germans and Poles of East 
                                                          
25Agnieszka Hreczuk, ‘Polish-Russian Relations and Kaliningrad’, in Russian Participation in Baltic Sea 
Region-Building: A Case Study of Kaliningrad, ed. Paul Holtom/Fabrizio Tassinari (Gdansk: BaltSeaNet, 2002), 
70. 
26Helmut Spies, ‘Ein Erinnerungsfoto aus Ribbenischken Wiedersehen mit der Heimat nac dreiundvierzi g 
Jahren‘, Das Ostpreußenblatt, no. 10 (1993): 13. 
Prussian origin helped turn the region’s pre-Soviet history from an ideologically embarrassing 
relic to be avoided into a major economic asset for the political and cultural elites of the 
region.27 
 
This wider political and economic context was crucial to driving a cultural re-engagement 
with the legacies of German East Prussia in Kaliningrad that went far beyond the small circle 
of intellectual and eccentrics that had explored the region’s history as an act of revolt in the 
1970s and 1980s. In an environment where all the certainties of Soviet society had collapsed, 
the economic opportunities as well as the yearning for a new sense of civic identity among 
large segments of the population created the basis for a re-engagement with the German past. 
Helped with German state and charitable funding, state and private initiatives such as Stiftung 
Königsberg and the Marga und Kurt Möllgaard Stiftung worked to restore lost relics of East 
Prussian architecture. 28 Though rebuilding of the old Lutheran cathedral and parts of the pre-
1945 inner city along the harbor attracted the most attention, these efforts were emulated in 
smaller towns across the region trying to use identification with a romanticized version of 
Prussian history to attract investors from both the EU and Russia. 
 
In such a conducive environment, in Kaliningrad’s two universities members of faculty with a 
particular interest in East Prussian legacies had the space to build a lasting institutional 
framework for engagement with Kaliningrad’s pre-Soviet past. These efforts did encounter 
considerable suspicion from politicians and education officials in Moscow. The statement by 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev in 1994 that “Russia needs to maintain an imposing 
presence in order to avoid being squeezed out of the region” reflected widespread worries 
within the central Russian state that greater contact between the local population and 
                                                          
27Raymond A. Smith, ‘The Kaliningrad Region: Applications of the Civic and Ethnic Models of Nationhood’, 
Journal of Baltic Studies 24, no. 3 (2007): 236. 
28Kirsten Salein, Das Leben ist Keine Himbeere: Perspektiven Jugendlicher in Kaliningrad (Münster: Lit Verlag, 
2005), 103. 
neighbouring European states may be the first step towards the emergence of Kaliningrad 
separatism.29 Yet as the ability of education officials in Moscow to control the actions of 
academic administrators in far-flung outposts diminished, the two main universities in the 
exclave were able to provide the space for students and academics to explore regional history 
without interference. With the politics of the region rife with corruption and organised crime, 
local authorities were also too pre-occupied with personal survival to block such engagement 
with German and Polish partners.30  
 
 By the mid-1990s an embrace of the pre-Soviet past came to reshape almost every academic 
department in the university. From architecture and urban planning to law and politics, a 
whole range of faculties focused on local history as well as wider Polish, German and 
European legal frameworks that were reshaping the region around the exclave. Courses with 
titles such as Immanuel Kant’s Philosophy and Modernity or European Union Law played as 
prominent a role as Russia-oriented subject matter.31 Though ill-prepared for a post-Soviet 
order, university administrators quickly understood that this embrace of the region’s German 
past could also attract significant research grants and support funding from German and 
Polish state institutions and academic foundations. In a context where educational institutions 
were being starved for funding by a financially strapped state, focusing on links with German 
and Polish universities and funding bodies that could provide crucial training and grants was 
of existential importance for local higher education institutions that were coming under heavy 
pressure.32 
 
                                                          
29Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 237. 
30Mark Galeotti, ‘Kaliningrad: A Fortress without a State’, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (1993): p. 57. 
31‘Course Guide’, Department for Study Programmes and Education Policy (Kaliningrad State University, 
2002). 
32Stefan Gänzle, Stefan Meister and Conrad King, ‘The Bologna Process and Its Impact on Higher Education at 
Russia's Margins: The Case of Kaliningrad’, Higher Education 57, no. 4 (2009): 537. 
By 1999 the outlines of a new Kaliningrad political and cultural order was clearly emerging. 
While late Soviet elites had managed to survive in the new order, the promotion of a 
distinctive Kaliningrad identity based on its territorial isolation from Russia and an East 
Prussian historical legacy provided them with a new means through which to legitimise their 
position by balancing political loyalty to Moscow with economic and cultural cooperation 
with Germany and Poland.33 For the region’s intellectual elite, deeper engagement with the 
region’s history and the partial reconstruction of physical landmarks of its German past 
provided the basis of access to German and EU cultural institutions to a more extensive scale 
than was possible on the Russian “mainland”. Disoriented by rapid change, a rediscovery of 
the region’s post-1945 settler experience and pre-1945 German legacy among the wider 
public provided a regional identity narrative that that blended Soviet and Prussian elements to 
build a sense of cosmopolitan distinctiveness from Moscow without necessarily representing a 
full break from the Russia cultural world. This sense that in Kaliningrad there was no 
contradiction between asserting an identity that was both European as well as Russian is in 
itself reflected in the Immanuel Kant University’s mission statement that was first released in 
2005: 
 
The main symbols of the University, shown in its logo, are a sea wave and a bridge. The 
Kaliningrad region is developing as one of Russia's zones of integration into the European 
sociocultural space. The region bridges economy, politics, culture, education and science of 
Russia and the European Union. The rising sea wave symbolises the coastal location of the 
University, its progress and sustainable development.  
 
The wave creates the image of university life as a vast space of knowledge and constant 
striving for sociocultural understanding in the Baltic Sea region - one of the most successful 
                                                          
33Yann Richard, ‘The Russian Exclave of Kaliningrad: Challenges and Limits of its Integration in the Baltic 
Region’, Cybergeo: European Journal of Geography, no. 719 (2015): 7. 
macroregions in the world, which brings together countries with the highest global 
competitiveness ranking. A symbol of connection and integration, the bridge represents 
increasing academic mobility and promotion of Russian higher education and innovative 
technologies abroad, offering the benefits of both European and Russian academic traditions.  
The bridge also shows a historical tie between the once-famous Albertina University and the 
University of today. 34  
 
Kaliningrad universities therefore focused on the region’s history with the active cooperation 
of the regional government and built links with colleagues in Germany, Poland and Lithuania 
as an instrumental part of this process of regional identity construction. The intensification of 
such teaching and research activities built on discursive engagement with three key themes 
that were intended to provide the basis for a European future that blended German historical 
legacies with contemporary Russian cultural discourses.  
 
The first was the physical reconstruction of architectural remnants of the German past. As a 
consequence Kaliningrad’s educational institutions fostered particular specialisms in 
architecture, archaeology, urban planning and urban history as private and state demand rose 
for graduates with experience in these disciplines. Urban reconstruction projects, which began 
with the city of Kaliningrad and then spread to smaller towns such as Baltiysk, restored many 
surviving buildings in consultation with academics at both universities without fundamentally 
altering the pre-existing Soviet urban layout. The economic strategy underpinning these 
reconstruction programmes was bluntly explained by the region’s governor Georgi Boos in 
2004:  
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The better quality of life that people have, the less they want cataclysms or a political crisis. 
It's an axiom of Marx: poverty is the cause of instability. The cause of stability is wealth.35  
 
With some support from German funding grants as well as Russian state banks, these projects 
were intended to attract tourists to the region by celebrating its past. In the process they bound 
academic staff interested in reconstruction deeply into established state structures. Yet they 
also fostered an interest in German artefacts and architectural styles among the elite and an 
emerging middle class, creating newly built environments that resembled those in much of 
Central Europe rather than the rest of Russia.36 
 
The second area of focus for Kaliningrad’s universities was teaching and research relating to 
the culture and history of East Prussia. While the school curriculum remained heavily 
regulated by the central Russian state, courses in universities could examine German history 
and cultural traditions connected to the region more freely.37 Expanded access to German 
language teaching and the establishment of local Lutheran parishes fostered by the German 
consulate and the Goethe Institut opened up access to European and German economic and 
educational opportunities. Yet within the university and schools curricula the particular 
interactions of Russian thinkers, politicians and soldiers with East Prussia were also 
emphasized on the initiative of teaching staff but with the active support of the regional 
administration in order to retain a sense of connection with the Russian cultural world. 
Professors Eduard Demidenko and Vladimir Krivosheev reflect this belief among many local 
academics in finding a balance between German and Russian elements in assessing a student 
survey on teaching: 
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 Although the interest to the region’s history seems to be considerable and there is a course of 
“History of Russian West” taught in secondary school, the survey revealed insufficient 
knowledge of facts and events of the past. It is well known that from 1758 until 1762 during 
the Seven Years’ war Eastern Prussia was actually a part of the Russian Empire. In German 
historiography, this period is referred to as “the first Russian period.38 
 
In this context, a particular focus within local schools and university humanities departments 
on Immanuel Kant, who was presented as founding figure of European as well as Russian 
philosophy helped provide a framework through which Kaliningrad’s German and Soviet 
histories could be balanced. Whereas Lenin remained the focus of the region’s Soviet identity 
discourse before 1989, Immanuel Kant took this place after 1991 to become a symbol of a 
Kaliningrad identity that blended European and Russian identities.39 
 
The final component embedded within universities was an engagement with the politics and 
law of Germany, Poland and the European Union that placed the development of a Russian 
Kaliningrad as part of a wider project of contemporary European integration. With the 
integration of Poland into the European Union and Germany’s dominant economic role in the 
Baltic region the legal framework of the states surrounding Kaliningrad oblast began to shape 
its socio-political development. Through the creation of a Special Economic Zone for the 
region the Putin administration went on to ensure that a highly corrupt Kaliningrad elite only 
pursued European economic opportunities in a manner that was coordinated by Moscow.40 
For local politicians and businessmen access to specialist knowledge in European affairs 
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became economically crucial to a far greater extent than any other Russian region. The 
foundation of an Institute in European Studies in Kaliningrad State Technical University as 
well as significant levels of regular cooperation between academics in Kaliningrad and 
universities such as Viadrina in Frankfurt an der Oder and Wuppertal in Germany, Gdansk 
University of Technology in Poland or Vilnius University in Lithuania played a crucial role in 
drawing the exclave into a whole range of EU led institutional and economic projects.41 
Bolstered through student exchanges, such educational and institutional interaction between 
Kaliningrad and its neighbours helped embed it in the European integration process to an 
extent far beyond any other Russian region in the first decade of Vladimir Putin’s rule. 
 
In each of these three areas both universities attained a role in regional development that went 
beyond that of regular higher education institutions in other parts of the Russian Federation. 
As a key point of contact with political elites in neighbouring states, academics helped 
provide the basis for wider projects of economic and political development such as the 
reconstruction of parts of historical Königsberg. As part of a wider project of ambiguous 
regional identity building the universities also became a focal point for those elements within 
the elite and parts of the population that came to see themselves as part of a culturally distinct 
part of both the Russian as well as the European cultural worlds. Finally, as an increasingly 
prominent interest group in itself, the university community could promote its instrumental 
role in the region’s relationship with the European integration project to lobby for greater 
access to funds, higher student numbers and institutional autonomy. With the Polish, German 
and Lithuanian governments particularly interested in promoting prosperity and stability in 
such a strategically important region, by the late 1990s and early 2000s higher education 
institutions along with a range of businesses and civil society institutions were increasingly 
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well integrated in wider European research and economic structures overseen by the European 
Union.42  
 
Though fringe elements within the Russian Far Right and the security services concerned 
about potential separatist tendencies in Kaliningrad viewed these endeavours with some 
considerable suspicion, the economic reformers that helped shape policy during Vladimir 
Putin’s first term in office emphasized strong business and educational ties with European 
states. In this context, for the first decade of Vladimir Putin’s presidency local Kaliningrad 
intellectual and business leaders had the full support of the Russian federal authorities in 
efforts to build institutional relationships with European partners. During his visit in 2005 for 
the city’s 750th anniversary celebrations, Vladimir Putin personally backed these efforts in 
stating that: 
 
Kaliningrad represents Russia’s westernmost border and its proximity to European countries 
and extensive infrastructure will unquestionably help the region’s development…. Russia will 
always give Kaliningrad’s development the attention it requires and will make use of its 
financial, legal and administrative possibilities for this purpose. 43 
 
With such state support universities had the space to emphasise Kaliningrad’s East Prussian 
past and adopt the legacy of the pre-war Königsberg universities as their own. This matched 
the completion of a cityscape whose architecture came to resemble that of East German and 
Polish cities rather than the urban landscapes common in Russia. This effort at reconstructing 
physical and institutional continuities with aspects of East Prussia’s historical legacy 
culminated with the lavish celebration of the city’s 750 year anniversary in 2005 attended by 
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Gerhard Schröder and Vladimir Putin.44 In the same year Kaliningrad University was renamed 
Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, one of only twelve fully Federal universities in 
Russia. This both increased the university’s prestige and funding within the Russian higher 
education system and emphasized the region’s particular Baltic European identity: reflecting 
the extent to which central authorities in Moscow felt willing to accept Kaliningrad’s social 
and cultural distinctiveness within the Russian Federation.45 
 
Though not directly related to the development of the university itself, the final step towards 
reshaping the Kaliningrad’s relationship with the EU would also help to strengthen its own 
internal emphasis on a connection with a German past and a European present. After 
replacing Vladimir Putin in the presidency in 2008, Dmitry Medvedev made several 
statements emphasizing Kaliningrad potential as a showcase to Europe for the emergence of a 
truly modern Russia. As part of this initiative, Medvedev gave his full support to negotiations 
with the EU to ease visa restrictions for the region’s residents.46 By 2010 Kaliningraders 
gained access to a special visa regime, allowing them free day access to neighbouring Polish 
oblasts and easing the process it took for Kaliningraders to gain work and tourist visas across 
the Schengen Area.47 These further steps to integration with European Union legal 
frameworks also benefited the university, with easier travel back and forth into neighbouring 
states making it relatively straightforward for academics and researchers to regularly 
collaborate with colleagues in Poland, Lithuania and Germany.  
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The centerpiece of this intensifying engagement between the Kaliningrad region and 
neighbouring member states of the European Union was the foundation of the Kaliningrad 
Technical University’s Klaus Mehnert Centre for European Studies. Established in 2005 as a 
small department focusing on European politics and law with financial assistance from the 
Robert Bosch Foundation, it attracted students interested in opportunities provided through 
Erasmus exchange agreements with universities across the European Union.48 In 2009 it even 
gave the SPD Speaker of the European Parliament Martin Schulz an honorary doctorate, at a 
ceremony at which former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was also a speaker. The extent to 
which senior German politicians and foundations were willing to get involved even with 
relatively such minor academic initiatives underscored how far German institutions were 
willing to go to assist Kaliningrad Oblast’s further integration into a European institutional 
framework.49 As institutions that symbolized a growing engagement particularly of young 
Kaliningraders with the European states surrounding their region, the universities continued to 
play a central role in projects promoting cooperation and exchange. 
 
The historical legacy of East Prussia was instrumentalised in several distinct ways in this 
period of intensifying cooperation between the EU and Russia. On a local level, Kaliningrad 
elites trying to reconcile clashing identity narratives and economic interests by focusing on 
particular aspects of the East Prussian legacy that did not involve conflict with Russia. In this 
context, the celebration of the memory of Immanuel Kant proved an ideal framework for a 
revival of aspects of the East Prussian past without incurring fears of Kaliningrad separatism 
in Moscow. Rather than engaging with aspects of a German past associated with military 
hostility to Russia such as the role of the Teutonic Knights or the military exploits of the 
Prussian monarchy, the intellectual cosmopolitanism Immanuel Kant represented as well as 
his influence on Russian philosophers could enable academic elites to construct a sense of 
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historical continuity between a pre-1945 East Prussia and a post-1945 Kaliningrad that could 
act as bridges between Moscow and wider Europe. A 2013 speech by the university rector to 
the DAAD is a typical example of this form of ideological syncretism: 
 
Our University began its life as Kaliningrad State Pedagogical Institute in 1947. In 1966, it 
was granted the university status; in 2005 the University was renamed Immanuel Kant Federal 
University of Russia by a decree of the Government of the Russian Federation. Being an 
innovative institution, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University strives to maintain and spread 
academic and research traditions of its predecessor – the Albertina University of Königsberg. 
The Albertina, one of the oldest universities in Europe, had a 460-year history. I. Kant, J. 
Hamann, J. Herder, F.W. Bessel, K. Jacobi, F. Linderman, А. Gurvits, D. Hilbert and H. 
Helmholtz taught at the Albertina University. К. Donelaitis, the founder of Lithuanian 
literature, delivered lectures on theology there. E.T.A. Hoffman, the famous writer and 
composer, attended lectures in philosophy at Albertina. The University's greatest alumnus is 
Immanuel Kant, the world famous philosopher, who was a Russian citizen for some time. The 
name of I. Kant forever tied the city of Königsberg and the Albertina University with the 
spiritual heritage of humankind and the history of the region.50 
 
Moreover, Kant’s global prominence as a philosopher could also allow Kaliningrad 
intellectual and economic elites to present their region as a place of world importance to 
bolster external tourism and investment. In a similar fashion, the reconstruction of the 
historical port of Königsberg in which the university’s architecture and history departments 
played a crucial role fostered a historical narrative in which the region was part of a Baltic 
world in which Russia and Europe played an equal part.51 For Kaliningrad elites and the wider 
population, the celebration of Immanuel Kant therefore became a key symbol of a regional 
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identity in which Russian and German cultural elements could interact in a positive manner 
rather than becoming a source of political conflict.  
 
References to Kant went beyond references to his philosophical work in promotional 
literature for the region. Near the front entrance in buildings that had once housed the pre-
1945 Albertinum a statue of Kant was put up as a central symbol of the region’s pre-1945 as 
well as its post-1945 identity. Despite an emphasis on restoration of Russian national 
sovereignty that became increasingly pervasive in national state institutions during the Putin 
presidency, mayors, oblast governors or other city officials were willing to support and be 
seen to be engaged with efforts that emphasised and celebrated aspects of the East Prussian 
historical legacy that demonstrated how their region in the past and present were part of a 
wider European cultural community.52 Through this particular emphasis on the role of the 
university and other cultural institutions in framing the Kaliningrad region’s identity a local 
political elite vulnerable to Moscow’s interventionism was willing to portray the region s both 
European as well as Russian in a way that did not indicate any contradictions between both 
social environments. 
 
In contrast to the efforts of the university and the local government, during the 750 year 
anniversary celebrations the military, Federal culture ministry and national volunteer 
organizations sponsored public spectacles that placed the region within the confines of a 
Russian national narrative. Veterans associations and the army financed re-enactments of the 
Second World War conquest of Königsberg or Eylau during the Napoleonic Wars that were 
pivotal to Russian history, while the city government took pains to emphasise the pivotal role 
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the region played during these key moments in Russian history.53 While the region’s political 
and cultural elite emphasized Immanuel Kant’s cosmopolitanism and old Baltic trading links, 
a central ceremony during the anniversary celebrations focused on a re-enactment of the 
eighteenth century arrival of Peter the Great in the city, implying that it had always been 
connected to Russian imperial expansion. During these same ceremonies a new Russian 
Orthodox cathedral was opened, set in deliberate contrast to the attempts by the city 
government and German foundations to fund the restoration of the old pre-war Lutheran 
Cathedral.54 
 
As the Putin government worked to concentrate power in the hands of the presidency and 
limit the autonomy of regional governments the space for local elites in Kaliningrad to 
strengthen links with their European neighbours became more constricted. Despite claims of 
political liberalization under Putin’s temporary successor Dmitry Medvedev, Russian security 
services fostered networks of nationalist and neo-Soviet organizations in the region to counter 
what they considered to be potential separatist tendencies. By 2008, once obscure Cossack 
groups enjoyed funding from the Kaliningrad state culture department in a region whose pre-
1945 history and post-1945 population had little direct contact with Cossack traditions.55 
Concerned that the bulk of the region’s population had repeatedly visited Europe while only a 
minority had visited “mainland” Russia more than once, federal authorities also initiated a 
programme of state grants for school visits to Moscow and St Petersburg.56  In the run up to 
local elections the security services moved to eliminate the Baltic Republican Party and other 
movements that supported a limited degree of autonomy and replace them with candidates 
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less willing to make decisions on their own initiative. Under such pressure from Moscow, by 
2013 local politicians began to distance themselves from the previous decade’s effort to 
engage with the region’s history, instead focusing on a revival of nostalgia for the supposed 
military greatness of Soviet society.57  
 
These step by step moves to reimpose central control over the region were not entirely 
successful. Having eliminated gubernatorial elections in 2005, the Putin administration 
imposed an outsider to the region in the person of Georgy Boos as governor. This proved an 
unfortunate choice, as Boos’s attempts to take control of various local forms of corrupt state 
revenue sharing pushed local elites too far and offended a wider population unwilling to pay 
additional fees to finance increases in institutional graft. These tensions culminated in a wave 
of protests that forced the removal of the governor and his replacement in 2010 by Nikolai 
Tsukanov, a locally born politician who balanced support from Kaliningrad powerbrokers 
with demonstrations of loyalty to President Putin.58 As part of a process to mollify local 
discontent, further state financial grants were disbursed to the local university and historical 
reconstruction efforts. At the same time, the Russian Ministry of Interior secure partial access 
to the Schengen area for Kaliningrad residents with the EU Commission and confirmed the 
continuation of the Special Economic Zone framework for a further five years.59 
 
As a consequence, while failed protests in Moscow against the return of Vladimir Putin to the 
presidency in 2011 led to increased repression, the initial impact of this conservative turn in 
Kaliningrad was more limited. Though Governor Tsukanov was heavily involved in highly 
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dubious business dealings he remained unwavering in his loyalty to the Putin government. 
Yet as a locally rooted political figure, he also demonstrated commitment to the expansion of 
the university as well as the continued restoration and beautification of the historic quarters of 
Kaliningrad and other towns in the region. For all the pressure from Moscow on other aspects 
of Kaliningrad’s relationship with the European Union, the university’s role as a symbol of 
the region’s prosperity and connectedness with the wider world largely remained unscathed.60 
 
Yet even this rearguard action to preserve the political, economic and cultural particularites 
Kaliningrad had come to enjoy within the Russian political system could not withstand the 
pressures unleashed by the Russian army’s occupation of Crimea and escalation against the 
Ukrainian state in the Donbas region. While initial EU sanctions in response to the shooting 
down of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 over East Ukraine and the invasion of Crimea 
did not directly affect Kaliningrad, the counter-sanctions set by the Kremlin limiting exports 
of agricultural goods from the EU marked the first step towards the unraveling of the region’s 
special relationship with its German, Lithuanian and Polish neighbours.61 A succession of 
military exercises that were seen as provocative by the Polish government along with 
restrictions on the travel of police and judicial officials set a tone that disrupted cooperation 
between the region’s institutions and their EU counterparts. The cancellation of Kaliningrad’s 
privileges as a Special Economic Zone on 1 April 2016 effectively crippled the basis for 
business collaboration between the region and European Union countries overnight, while the 
replacement of Nikolai Tsukanov as governor by an former member of the Russian security 
services with no previous connections to Kaliningrad in August 2016 indicated a systematic 
attempt to limit the power of local elites.62 
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In this increasingly repressive environment, the basis for academic and cultural collaboration 
between Kaliningrad’s universities and European partners was systematically undermined. 
Prominent Moscow commentators began openly speaking over concerns of German-backed 
separatism in Kaliningrad. This statement in 2014 by the editorial board of the influential and 
extreme nationalist Zavtra magazine was a characteristic example of such paranoia: 
 
Experts do not exclude the possibility that events similar to those in Kyiv could take place in 
Kaliningrad. According to them, we must clearly understand that is another question. If the 
West wants to take revenge for Crimea, it is likely that the object of this will be the 
Kaliningrad region, cutting it off from the main part of Russia. 63 
 
In such a febrile political environment, projects as the Klaus Mehnert European Institute or 
partnerships with prominent German universities were either shut down or wound back to a 
minimum. Often these actions were taken without any public announcement, as local German 
blogger Uwe Erich Niemeier noted to his dismay: 
 
And the Russian side? Why doesn’t it publicise the closure? Are the Russians silent because 
they do not want a worsening of the situation between Germany and Russia? But the closure 
of a German education institution is a worsening of the situation and when it is done without a 
justification, perhaps the same will happen as happened with the „Black List“ a few days 
ago… My god, how much is now being destroyed that was built through decades of 
meticulous and sometimes also difficult work.64 
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 Teaching of and public engagement with the region’s German history has now once again 
come under the scrutiny of the security services, leading academics to move to positions in 
German universities or shift to less fraught research topics. In a region where for twenty-five 
years much of the population and local elites fostered an environment in which it was 
considered possible to be consider oneself both a good European as well as a good Russian, 
sudden shifts in the political outlook of the top echelons of government in Moscow are 
forcing individuals and institutions to choose between these two forms of identity.65   
 
It is therefore an open question as to whether cultural and political elites in Kaliningrad are 
still in a position to pursue an identity narrative at increasing variance to Eurasianist 
ideological goals popular with the circle around Vladimir Putin that portray Russia as a 
civilization separate from Europe.66 At a moment when meetings run by academics to discuss 
European culture such as the literature of Kafka and Orwell come under attack by pseudo-
Cossacks who receive state funding, the space to engage with an identity narrative that 
reconciles a society built by Soviet settlers with the long German history of the region looks 
increasingly bleak.67 Though Moscow may succeed in eroding any sense of cultural 
distinctiveness in the region, it is equally possible that a particular regional sensibility built 
around regular contact with the region’s neighbours and engagement with the region’s diverse 
past may be difficult to eradicate. If that is that case, attempts by the Putin administration to 
impose political and cultural uniformity could become counter-productive, entrenching 
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exactly the sense of distinctiveness within the Kaliningrad region that the Russian central 
government fears might become a foundation for separatist aspirations. 
 
Whatever the outcome of these political pressures, the way in which universities in 
Kaliningrad became a focal point for attempts to reconcile a German past with a Russian 
present in a wider European cultural framework demonstrates how higher education 
institutions can become areas of focus for clashing identity narratives. As we have seen, 
Martin Klimke and Rosemary Deem explored how spaces in which students examine and 
academics reinterpret historical artefacts can play a crucial role in reframing the way regions 
or even entire nations structure their political institutions.68 While in 1960s Germany or the 
United States the role of universities in shaping identity construction led to considerable 
conflict between students, academics and the state, in Kaliningrad after 1991 there were 
strong incentives for local elites to back attempts by academics to develop an identity 
narrative that revived memory of an East Prussian based on German as well as wider Baltic 
European traditions.  
 
Once relations between President Putin and the leaders of the European Union broke down, 
however, the loss in regional autonomy experienced by Kaliningrad Oblast over the previous 
decade and a half meant that federal authorities could undermine the institutional 
underpinnings of a shared European and Russian identity that had become central to the ethos 
of its higher education institutions. The experience of universities in Kaliningrad could 
therefore provide scholars with more fundamental insights into the interaction between higher 
education and processes of identity construction that are of relevance to other societies 
undergoing rapid social change. Yet whether Kaliningrad’s universities will survive their 
                                                          
68Klimke, The Other Alliance, 26 and Deem, ‘Globalisation, New Managerialism’, 17. 
current moment of adversity after a quarter century of recovery and expansion remains an 
open question. 
 
